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Abstract
We discuss the systemic risk implied by the interbank exposures reconstructed with the maximum
entropy method. The maximum entropy method severely underestimates the risk of interbank contagion
by assuming a fully connected network, while in reality the structure of the interbank network is sparsely
connected. Here, we formulate an algorithm for sparse network reconstruction, and we show numerically
that it provides a more reliable estimation of the systemic risk.
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1 Introduction
The analysis of interbank contagion has been receiving attention recently due to the increasing deterioration
of the stability in the interbank lending market [1]- [10]. This instability may lead to a domino effect, where
the failure of a bank may trigger a cascading of failures of other banks, even if they are not directly exposed
to the initially failing bank. Therefore, it is essential to understand the potential contagion mechanisms in
order to minimize the systemic risk imposed by an unperforming interbank lending network.
The correct estimation of the risk of contagion suffers from the incomplete knowledge of the details
regarding the interbank bilateral exposures, which generally are not available because the banks do not
disclose their bilateral exposures to central banks and regulators. In general, only the total interbank assets
and liabilities of each bank can be estimated from their balance sheet [1]- [10]. Therefore the bilateral
exposures, which are essential for risk models, cannot be estimated without imposing further assumptions.
The standard approach is to estimate the bilateral exposures using the Maximum Entropy (ME) method
which spreads the exposures as evenly as possible, such that it satisfies the constraints corresponding to
the total assets and liabilities for each bank [1]- [10]. Unfortunately, this method is known to provide an
unrealistic network topology, because it assumes a fully connected network, while in reality the interbank
network is sparsely connected [9, 11, 12]. The real sparse network structure is dictated by the fact that
banks cannot spread their network linkages across the entire system, because maintaining such a large
number of connection is obviously costly, and therefore often the network is very sparse, with only a small
number of established connections [12]. As a direct consequence of this discrepancy, the ME method severely
underestimates the risk of interbank contagion.
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Several algorithms for sparse network reconstruction have been proposed in order to overcome the lim-
itations of the ME method [11, 12]. These algorithms are based on heuristic methods and they have a
relatively high cost computational requirements. Here we formulate another algorithm for sparse network
reconstruction, with a much simpler architecture and very fast implementation. We show numerically that
this algorithm achieves a high degree of network sparsity, and using numerical stress-test simulations we
show that it provides a more reliable risk estimation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The standard dense network reconstruction approach
is described in Section 2. In Section 3 we discuss the sparse reconstruction algorithm and its implementation.
The performance of the proposed algorithm is analyzed in Section 4. In Section 5 we formulate and simulate
the contagion stress-test for the proposed algorithm. The final Section 6 summarizes the main results and
the conclusions.
2 Dense network reconstruction
We consider a network of N banks B = {b0, . . . , bN−1}, where each bank may borrow to or lend money from
other banks in B. The interbank relationship can be represented by an N ×N matrix x = [xij ]N×N where
xij ≥ 0 denotes outstanding loans and deposits of bank bi to bank bj . The sum of the matrix elements
across the row i gives the total value of bank bi assets, and the sum across the column j gives bank bj total
liabilities as follows:
ai =
N−1∑
j=0
xij , `j =
N−1∑
i=0
xij . (1)
Also, without restricting generality we consider a closed economy, such that total interbank assets and
liabilities are equal:
N−1∑
i=0
ai =
N−1∑
j=0
`j = Λ, (2)
and therefore the exposures reflect the relative importance of each bank in the interbank network. Without
loss of generality we also assume that Λ = 1, unless stated otherwise.
The x matrix provides information about the interbank exposures, and in principle it should be sufficient
to estimate the risk of contagion. However, as mentioned in the introduction the bilateral exposures xij are
generally unknown, and only the total assets ai and liabilities `j are typically observable from the balance
sheet of each bank. Therefore, the main problem is to estimate the interbank exposures matrix x, given only
the assets ai and liabilities `j , i, j = 0, . . . , N − 1.
The ME method solves the following optimization problem, subject to the constraints (1):
max
x
Sx, (3)
where
Sx = −
N−1∑
i=0
N−1∑
j=0
xij lnxij . (4)
is the entropy of the matrix x. Using the the method of Lagrange multipliers one can easily show that the
solution for this problem is:
xij = ai`j , i, j = 0, . . . , N − 1. (5)
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Intuitively, this solution spreads the exposures as evenly as possible, consistent with the constraints, filling
completely the matrix x, which is not in agreement with the real interbank networks.
A first improvement is to consider that a bank cannot have an exposure to itself, which means that the
diagonal elements of the matrix x must be zero:
x0ij =
ai`j i 6= j0 i = j . (6)
Obviously, the matrix x0 can no longer satisfy the imposed constraints (1). However, one can find a solution
x that minimizes the Kullback-Leibler divergence (also known as the cross entropy or the relative entropy)
between x and x0:
D(x ‖ x0) =
N−1∑
i=0
N−1∑
j=0
xij ln
xij
x0ij
, (7)
which means that the solution x will be as close as possible to x0. Since D is not defined for x0ii = 0, we
should note that for x, ε > 0 we have:
lim
x→0
x lnx = 0, (8)
lim
ε→0
x ln
x
ε
=∞. (9)
Therefore, the optimization problem subject to the constraints (1) becomes:
min
x
D(x ‖ x0). (10)
This problem can no longer be solved analytically, and therefore requires numerical optimization. The RAS
algorithm provides a computationally efficient method to solve this minimization problem [13].
The algorithm starts by allocating an array x with N2 number of elements, and setting xij(0) = x0ij . The
algorithm iterates the following equations:
xij(t+ 1) =
xij(t)ai∑N−1
n=0 xin(t)
, i, j = 1, . . . , N − 1 (11)
xij(t+ 1) =
xij(t+ 1)`j∑N−1
n=0 xnj(t+ 1)
, j, i = 1, . . . , N − 1, (12)
such that a complete iteration consists of two loops, corresponding to the rows and respectively the columns
of x. The algorithm stops when the Euclidean distance η between two complete iterations is smaller that a
prescribed error 0 < δ  1:
η = ‖x(t+ 1)− x(t)‖ < δ. (13)
The solution matrix x is called the Maximum Entropy (ME) solution in the economic literature, since it
is the closest matrix to the ME matrix (12), and consistent with the imposed constraints (1) [1]- [12]. This
solution is still dense because only the diagonal of the matrix x is zero, which also leads to an unrealistic
interbank network structure.
3
3 Sparse network reconstruction
Let us assume that the interbank network is sparse, and it is described by the adjacency matrix q = [qij ]N×N .
The adjacency matrix has binary coefficients qij ∈ {0, 1}, such that qij = 1 if there is a relationship between
the banks bi and bj , and qij = 0 otherwise. The connectivity κ ∈ [0, 1] and the sparsity σ ∈ [0, 1] of the
interbank network are therefore given by:
κ = N−2
N−1∑
i=0
N−1∑
j=0
qij , σ = 1− κ. (14)
Our goal is to find a matrix x consistent with the constraints (1), such that:
q = Θ(x), (15)
where Θ(x) is the Heaviside function applied element-wise:
qij = Θ(xij) =
1 if xij > 00 otherwise . (16)
We solve this problem by minimizing the Kullback-Leibler divergence between x and q:
min
x
D(x ‖ q). (17)
First we define a new set of variables as follows:
yij =
xij if qij = 10 if qij = 0 ⇔ xij = qijyij , (18)
such that the Lagrangian of the problem becomes:
L(yij , αi, λj) =
N−1∑
i=0
N−1∑
j=0
qijyij ln yij
+
N−1∑
i=0
αi
ai − N−1∑
j=0
qijyij

+
N−1∑
j=0
λj
(
`j −
N−1∑
i=0
qijyij
)
, (19)
The optimality conditions:
∂L
∂yij
= 0,
∂L
∂αi
= 0,
∂L
∂λj
= 0, (20)
give the following equations:
ln yij + 1− αi − λj = 0, (21)
N−1∑
j=0
qijyij = ai,
N−1∑
i=0
qijyij = `j . (22)
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From the first equation we have:
yij = exp (αi + λj − 1) . (23)
Here we define the new variables:
ψi = exp (αi − 1/2) , (24)
ϕj = exp (λj − 1/2) , (25)
such that:
yij = ψiϕj , i, j = 0, . . . , N − 1. (26)
From the constraints we also obtain the following equations:
ψi =
ai∑N−1
j=0 qijϕj
, i = 0, . . . , N − 1, (27)
ϕj =
`j∑N−1
i=0 qijψi
, j = 0, . . . , N − 1, (28)
which are the core of the sparse reconstruction algorithm.
The variables ψi and ϕj can be obtained iteratively from the above equations, as follows:
ψi(t+ 1) =
ai∑N−1
j=0 qijϕj(t)
, i = 1, . . . , N − 1 (29)
ϕj(t+ 1) =
`j∑N−1
i=0 qijψi(t+ 1)
, j = 1, . . . , N − 1. (30)
with the initial values given by:
ψi(0) = ai, ϕj(0) = `j , i, j = 0, . . . , N − 1 (31)
Finally, the solution of the optimization problem can be written as:
xij = qijyij = qijψiϕj , i, j = 0, . . . , N − 1. (32)
We call this algorithm the Sparse RAS (SRAS) algorithm, since it provides a solution to the Sparse ME
(SME) problem. The solution is the closest sparse matrix x to the adjacency matrix q, which is also consistent
with the constraints (1).
The pseudo-code of the SRAS algorithm is given in Algorithm 1. In the first step the initial values for
ψi and ϕj are set to ai and respectively `j . The main loop for calculating ψi and ϕj is executed until the
Euclidean distance (η in the pseudo-code) between two consecutive states {ψ0, . . . , ψN−1, ϕ0, . . . , ϕN−1},
corresponding to a complete iteration, is smaller that a prescribed error 0 < δ  1:
η =
N−1∑
i=0
[ψi(t+ 1)− ψi(t)]2 +
N−1∑
j=0
[ϕj(t+ 1)− ϕj(t)]2
1/2 ≤ δ. (33)
The final solution is calculated according to the equation (32), using the adjacency matrix q = [qij ] and
{ψ0, . . . , ψN−1, ϕ0, . . . , ϕN−1}.
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Algorithm 1 SRAS: calculates a sparse ME solution.
function SRAS(N, a, `, q, δ)
x← array(N2)
ψ ← array(N)
ϕ← array(N)
for i = 0 : N − 1 do
ψi ← ai
ϕi ← `i
end for
η ←∞
while √η > δ do
η ← 0
for i = 0 : N − 1 do
s← 0
for j = 0 : N − 1 do
s← s+ qijϕj
end for
ξ ← ai/s
η ← η + (ξ − ψi)2
ψi ← ξ
end for
for j = 0 : N − 1 do
s← 0
for i = 0 : N − 1 do
s← s+ qijψi
end for
ξ ← `j/s
η ← η + (ξ − ϕj)2
ϕj ← ξ
end for
end while
for i = 0 : N − 1 do
for j = 0 : N − 1 do
xij ← qijψiϕj
end for
end for
return x
end function
We should also note that the complexity of the main loop of the SRAS algorithm is O(2N2), while the
complexity of the main loop of the RAS algorithm is O(4N2). Thus, SRAS is twice faster than RAS, due
to the fact that the iterated variables ψ and ϕ are one dimensional arrays of size N (SRAS), comparing to
x which is an array of size N2 (RAS).
Given the correct adjacency matrix q of the interbank network, the SRAS algorithm solves the problem
exactly, by providing the closest matrix x satisfying the constraints (1), such that q = Θ(x). Unfortunately,
in reality we do not know the correct adjacency matrix q, so we can only "guess" such a matrix by assuming
that we can estimate the connectivity κ. Therefore, the problem we are facing is to find an adjacency matrix
q with a given connectivity κ. Such an adjacency matrix will play the role of "support" for a candidate
solution matrix x, even though it may not be the real adjacency matrix.
Since the constraining values (1) are strictly non-negative, ai > 0 and `j > 0, i, j = 0, . . . , N − 1, the
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Algorithm 2 ADJACENCY-MATRIX: calculates a random adjacency matrix.
function ADJACENCY-MATRIX(N,κ, tmax)
q ← array(N2)
for i = 0 : N − 1 do
for j = 0 : N − 1 do
qij ← 0
end for
pi ← i
end for
for i = N − 1 : 1 do
j ← rand(i)
m← pi
pi ← pj
pj ← m
end for
for i = 0 : N − 1 do
qipi ← 1
end for
for n = N : κN2 − 1 do
m← rand(N2)
j ← bm/Nc
i← m− jN
while qij = 1 or i = j do
m← (m+ 1)modN2
j ← bm/Nc
i← m− jN
end while
qij ← 1
end for
return q
end function
minimum connectivity must be κmin = 1/N . Also, since the elements on the main diagonal must be always
equal to zero, the maximum connectivity is κmax = 1−1/N . We should note also that each row and column
of q must contain at least a nonzero element, otherwise q cannot be a support for x, which means that we
must have:
N−1∑
j=0
qij ≥ 1,
N−1∑
i=0
qij ≥ 1, i, j = 0, . . . , N − 1. (34)
Of course this is only a necessary condition, and it does not guarantee that the candidate solution x will
satisfy the imposed constraints (1). However, if this condition is satisfied, then the matrix q can play the
role of a support for a candidate solution.
A random adjacency matrix q with a given connectivity κ can be constructed with the Algorithm 2.
First we notice that any permutation matrix satisfies the minimum connectivity κmin = 1/N requirement,
since it has exactly one entry of 1 in each row and each column and 0s elsewhere. Therefore we initialize q
with a random permutation matrix. We should note that the permutation matrix must have the diagonal
elements equal to zero. Such a random permutation matrix can be obtained using a simple modification of
the Fisher-Yates shuffle algorithm [14], applied to the lines (or columns) of the identity matrix. This way
q becomes a permutation matrix with 0s on the diagonal. The algorithm continues by flipping randomly
κN2 − N 0s to 1, such that in the end there are κN2 1s in the matrix. Only the positions off the main
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diagonal are used in this process. The pseudo-code is given in Algorithm 2, and it solves the problem exactly
for 1/N ≤ κ ≤ 1− 1/N . Here b.c is the floor integer function, and the rand(m) function returns a uniform
random integer in {0, ...,m− 1}.
4 Sparse reconstruction numerical results
In this section we discuss the performance of the SRAS algorithm when we only know the connectivity κ of
the adjacency matrix and the randomly generated constraint values ai > 0 and `j > 0, i, j = 0, . . . , N−1. In
this case we first generate a support adjacency matrix q with the given connectivity κ, and then we calculate
the candidate solution x using the SRAS algorithm.
The above procedure does not guarantee that the SRAS algorithm will converge to the correct solution,
because it is very likely that the randomly generated adjacency matrix support is not the correct one. We
should note that this case is different from the case when the correct adjacency matrix is known, and SRAS
can find the solution x exactly. This is a consequence of the fact that not all the sparse adjacency matrices
q, with a given connectivity κ, can provide support to a candidate matrix x compatible with the constraints
(1). Therefore, the main question is: what is the minimum connectivity κ∗ for the randomly generated
adjacency matrices q that can provide the correct support for a candidate solution x satisfying the linear
constraints (1)? Therefore, we expect that there is a connectivity range [κ∗, κmax] for randomly generated
adjacency matrices q, that can also provide a support for the solution matrices x which are compatible
with the constraints (1). Here, κmax = 1 − 1/N corresponds to the dense network reconstruction case,
which always admits a compatible solution, however it is not clear how to find κ∗, which corresponds to
the minimum critical connectivity for which we can randomly choose a support q such that the resulted
candidate solution x satisfies the constraints (1).
In order to find k∗ numerically we measure the deviation from the constraints satisfaction as a function
of the connectivity κ:
ε =

∑N−1
i=0
(∑N−1
j=0 xij − ai
)2
+
∑N−1
j=0
(∑N−1
i=0 xij − `j
)2
∑N−1
i=0 a
2
i +
∑N−1
j=0 `
2
j

1/2
. (35)
We also measure the normalized entropy Sx ∈ [0, 1] of the candidate solution matrix x, as a function of κ:
Sx = − 1
2 lnN
N−1∑
i=0
N−1∑
j=0
xij lnxij , (36)
and the entropy Sq ∈ [0, 1] of the adjacency support matrix q:
Sq(κ) = −κ log2 κ− (1− κ) log2(1− κ). (37)
The numerical results are shown in Figure 1 for different network sizes: N = 25, 50, 75, 100, 200, 400. The
convergence tolerance parameter for the SRAS algorithm is set to δ = 10−7. The connectivity κ is varied
in the interval [κmin, κmax], with a step ∆κ = (κmax − κmin)/M , where kmin = 1/N , kmax = 1− 1/N and
M = 100. Also, for each κ we averaged the results over 103 trials.
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Figure 1: The deviation from the constraints satisfaction ε, the entropy of the solution Sx and the entropy
of the adjacency matrix Sq for the SME method (see the text for details).
We should note that the error ε is almost exactly described by the following Gaussian function:
ε(κ,N) =
1
2
exp
[
−1
8
(Nκ− 1)2
]
. (38)
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The continuous line on the figures is the fit with the above function. The gray area on the figures corresponds
to the interval [0, κ∗) where the procedure converged to a solution x inconsistent with the imposed constraints
(1), while the white area is the interval [κ∗, κmax] where the problem was solved with an error smaller than
ε∗ = 0.5 · 10−2. The critical value κ∗ where this transition occurs is inverse proportional with the size of the
network N :
κ∗(ε∗, N) =
(
1 +
√
8 ln
1
2ε∗
)
N−1, (39)
and therefore the error vanishes for large networks:
lim
N→∞
κ∗(ε∗, N) = 0. (40)
5 Contagion stress-test
Once the matrix of interbank exposures x is calculated, we can specify the shock that triggers the contagion.
Usually, the contagion is simulated by letting the banks go bankrupt one at a time and measuring the number
of banks that fail afterwards due to their direct or indirect exposure to the failing bank [3]. Therefore, one
bank failure potentially can trigger a cascade of consequent failures.
Let us suppose that ci(0) is the initial capital of the banks bi, i = 0, . . . , N − 1. Then the shock consists
in assuming that the bank bi ∈ B fails due to some external reasons, and therefore any bank bj , j 6= i,
j = 0, . . . , N − 1, loses a quantity of money equal to its exposure multiplied by a parameter θ ∈ [0, 1] for loss
rate (loss-given-default) [3, 11]. Therefore, if Ft ⊆ B is the set of banks that failed at the time step t, then
the capital of bank j at time t+ 1 is:
cj(t+ 1) = cj(t)− θ
∑
n∈Ft
xjn. (41)
If the loss of the bank bj exceeds its initial capital cj(0), which also means that the current capital becomes
negative:
cj(t+ 1) ≤ 0, (42)
then the bank bj also fails. The contagion process stops if no additional banks fail, otherwise another round
of contagion takes place. Thus, the quantity we measure is the fraction ξ ∈ [0, 1] of the banks that failed
after such a shock, as a function of the loss rate θ and the connectivity κ of the interbank network:
ξ(θ, κ) = N−1|F (θ, κ)|. (43)
In Figure 2 we show the simulation results for a network with N = 200 banks. Here we assumed that the
initial capital of the banks is ci = 0.01, i = 0, . . . , N−1, and Λ = N . The curves on the figures correspond to
the fraction ξ of the failed banks for: (i) the true exposure matrices, which are randomly generated (circles);
(ii) the standard ME solution for the dense matrix exposure reconstruction (stars); (iii) the SME solution
for the sparse matrix exposure reconstruction (squares).
One can see that the fraction of defaults ξ(θ, κ) undergoes a phase transition as a function of θ, which
shifts towards lower values of θ when the connectivity of the network κ decreases, as shown in Figure 2.
In fact, the fraction of defaults ξ can be described quite well by a simple logistic growth model with the
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Figure 2: The fraction of bank defaults ξ as a function of the loss rate θ and the connectivity κ: the true
exposure matrices (circles); the standard ME solution (stars); and the SME solution (squares).
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Figure 3: The parameters θ∗ and β of the logistic growth model for the fraction of bank defaults ξ as a
function of the connectivity κ.
solution:
ξ(θ, κ) =
1
1 + exp[−β(θ − θ∗)] , (44)
where θ∗ is the midpoint and β is the rate of growth (or the rate of defaults). The logistic model solution is
also shown in Figure 2, and it corresponds to the continuous lines. The parameters of the model are shown in
Figure 3. One can see that for the true matrix, the midpoint has a linear dependence on κ, θ∗ ' 0.05 + 0.5k,
while the rate β/N = 0.5 is constant. Also, one can see that the SME method provides a much more realistic
result at low connectivity values than the standard ME method, which severely underestimates the risk of
contagion.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have studied the systemic risk implied by the reconstruction of interbank exposures from
incomplete information. We have also developed an efficient algorithm to solve the sparse network recon-
struction problem. Also, we have shown numerically that this algorithm provides a more reliable estimation
of the risk of contagion in the interbank network than the standard approach based on the ME method. Our
solution also confirms the previous results obtained by comparing the ME bilateral exposures with those
obtained on the basis of actual bilateral exposures [9], showing once again that the ME method underrates
the risk of contagion. In fact, our numerical simulations show that the ME method, widely used in the
economics literature, severely underestimates the contagion risk, while the SME method proposed here gives
more robust results.
In a closing remark we would like to note that the simulation results of the contagion problem strongly
depend on the network topology and on the distribution values of the bilateral exposures, and only by knowing
the real exposures one can properly identify the actual channels for potential contagion. However, these
simplified models and simulations, based on incomplete information, show once again that such contagion
scenarios should not be taken too lightly, and relying on inadequate methods (such as the ME) does not
provide sufficient warning for a potential systemic risk failure.
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